

REMARKS

1. Reconsideration and further examination of the subject patent application in light of the present Amendment and Remarks is respectfully requested. Claims 1-21 are pending in this application. The specification has been objected to. Claims 1-2, and 13-19 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by U.S. Pat. No. 5,361,359 to Tajalli et al. Claims 3-12 and 20-21 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being obvious over Tajalli et al and further in view of EPO Pat. No. EP 0472487 to Munroe. After a careful review of the claims, it has been concluded that the rejections are improper and, consequently, the rejections are traversed.

2. The specification has been objected to. In response, the specification has been amended to correct typographical errors and other informalities, as required by the Examiner. For purposes of clarity only, a substitute specification is enclosed showing the changes, with new text shown as underlined, and deleted text shown as strikeout. Also, a version of the substitute specification incorporating all of the changes ("clean copy of specification") is attached after the signature page.

3. Claims 1-2 and 13-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Tajalli et al., as set forth in paragraphs 5-13 of the Office Action. In particular, the Examiner asserts that

"As per claim 1, the limitation of forming a least two trust group (sets) within a computer is disclosed by Tajalli (Column 6, 32-35; 50-53). Tajalli groups programs into High Integrity (most trusted because they are stored on a protected media), approved applications, and unapproved applications (Column 6, 27-30; 40-41; 56-59). Objects and

proceses are assigned these groups 'regardless of the privileges or attributes given to the application program or ordinary user by the underlying operating system' (Column 6, lines 2-4). This prevent hostile code (viruses and Trojan horses) from creating modified versions of itself (Column 7, lines 60-63). Tajalli also institutes a controlled execution CE system which prevent users and application programs from executing any application program which is not an approved application program (Column 7, lines 17-20) that is, the CE checks to see if a program is approved before it allows execute. Claim 1 is rejected."

It is noted first, in this regard that the claims are limited to the method step (and apparatus for) "comparing a trust group of the process with a trust group of the object or with the trust group of the second process, and allowing the operation according to the results of said comparing step". In this regard, it is believed that Tajalli et al. , inter alia, fails to provide any teaching or suggestion of a comparison step between trust groups.

For example, Tajalli et al. authorizes or denies input/output operations of protected files and applications depending on whether the operating system is currently in a General or a Trusted mode. The Tajalli process does not depend on which process initiated the request. Under Tajalli, et al. a process that initiates an input/output operation will be denied or allowed depending upon whether the targeted files / applications are in PM (protected memory area) and whether the modification request was initiated by the administrator through a trusted authentication path. Since a Tajalli et al. process in the General mode will always be denied access when it is in a PM and always allowed when it is not in a PM and always allowed in the Trusted mode, there is no comparison between the trust group of the process and the trust group of the object or trust group of the second process.

In this regard, Tajalli et al. explicitly states that “The underlying operating system and application programs can only be modified in the trusted path mode . . . The trusted path mode is only accessible by the administrator” (Tajalli et al., Column 9, lines 9-13). As such, if the targeted files / applications are in the protected area and the system is in the general purpose mode, the Tajalli et al. system will always deny any modification.

Under the claimed invention, an input/output operation is dependent upon a comparison of the requesting process’ trust group and the targeted file’s trust group. In contrast, under Tajalli et al., when the system is in General-purpose mode, no process can modify the protected files. When requests are made through the Tajalli et al. Trusted-path mode, any process can modify those files. In day-to-day use, this difference makes Tajalli’s method very different from that of the claimed invention. Consider for example a set of Microsoft Word documents.

Using Tajalli et al., the administrator must not place these documents in a protected area, otherwise users will not be able to work on the documents and modify the documents. Hence, a virus or Trojan horse program can read, modify or erase these documents. Tajalli et al. himself says that his HI system is meant to protect critical applications and data only, not all of the system’s installed programs and data. In this regard Tajalli et al. explicitly states (Column 6, lines 59-62) that “The HI system can therefore be used to protect certain critical applications and data without compromising system flexibility for non-critical applications and data”.

Using the claimed invention, the same documents will always be modifiable by Microsoft Word, as this application is Trusted. They will not, however, be modifiable by a virus or a Trojan horse, as these will be Untrusted.

Further the claimed process is dynamic whereas the process of Tajalli et al. is a static process. For example, “When the . . . process accesses some untrusted object . . . the operation is allowed . . . However, the process then passes from the trusted group to the untrusted group” (specification, page 10, lines 3-5).

As another example, the problem of protecting an application such as a Web navigator, against virus infection, and how it affects the Web navigator from legitimately self-updating itself through the Internet may be considered. Under Tajalli et al., a user can either place the Web navigator in the protected area to keep it safe, or leave it outside the protected area, where it will be vulnerable to virus infection. If the user puts it into the protected area, then whenever the Web navigator needs to auto-update itself (as many software programs do, for automating software updates & patches), the operation will fail. The update will not succeed because the Web navigator is not allowed to be modified (unless the Administrator explicitly enters Trusted mode).

Using the claimed invention, the Web navigator’s auto-update will succeed, as the Web navigator’s program is Trusted and is hence allowed to modify its Trusted files on the disk. A virus, on the other hand, will not be allowed modifying the Web navigator’s files, as it will not be Trusted.

At no time does Tajalli et al. let modifications occur over protected data without the Administrator’s authentication (through a physical TPM device). In contrast, the claimed invention doesn’t require Administrator privileges for authorizing modifications. Whether the computer user is an Administrator or a simple User, is not relevant.

To switch from General mode to Trusted mode (and vice-versa), Tajalli et al. provides a hardware device called TPM (Trusted Path Mechanism), through which Administrators can authenticate themselves and allow files to be modified. The hardware device provides “restrictions which cannot be changed by any application program or ordinary user, regardless of the privileges or attributes given to the application program or ordinary user by the underlying operating system” (Tajalli et al., Column 6, lines 1-4). However, although the restrictions are indeed independant of the user rights provided by the operating system, they are dependant on the user rights provided by the TPM. The TPM’s role is to authenticate the Administrator regardless of the operating system’s user rights, solely for security reasons. For example, “Use of the TPM assures the administrator that his administrative actions are not intercepted or modified by malicious application programs, and assures the underlying operating system that administrative actions are issued only by the administrator” (Tajalli et al., Column 6, lines 13-17). Further, “The HI system uses a Trusted Path Mechanism (TPM) to positively identify the administrator, and can therefore reliably limit PM write permission to him” (Tajalli et al., column 6, lines 46-49) and “Therefore, application programs and ordinary users (other than the administrator) are prevented from disabling the auditing” (Tajalli et al., column 7, lines 5-7).

Hence, the protection mechanism of allow / deny, still depends on the computer users rights (although independant of the operating system’s user rights). In the claimed invention, and through the entire application, the claimed subject matter is irrespective of the user and the user’s rights. The only role of the Administrator in the claimed invention, is to act as a supervisor, eventually defining new programs as Trusted, but even this task may be left to ordinary users.

The claimed invention does not require hardware to remain secure, since the invention does not rely on user rights to decide whether to allow / deny an operation.

Under the claimed invention, a process that was initially Trusted may become Untrusted and vice versa, in accordance with the files it opens and operations that it performs. Tajalli et al. does not allow doing this, because his invention does not look at processes, only at the files to protect.

Tajalli et al. does not include a concept of inheritance as described in the invention. Using the claimed invention, when a process creates files, these files inherit the same Trust attributes (i.e., the same rights and the same protection level). This is not possible under Tajalli et al., because the protection mechanism is not flexible enough ; the more elements are placed in the protected area, the less the computer will be useable. For instance, if a user places the application Microsoft Word in the protected area (and there were a concept of inheritance), then the user would end up generating document files which he will not be able to modify. Hence, not only the concept of inheritance does not exist in Tajalli et al., but if it did, then it would become a limitation of this technique. In the claimed invention, on the other hand, files created by Microsoft Word would be protected against modification by viruses & Trojan horses (Untrusted processes), but remain modifiable by users using Trusted applications.

In sum, since there is no comparison of trust groups among processes and objects, Tajalli et al. is fundamentally different than that of the claimed invention. Since Tajalli et al. is fundamentally different than that of the claimed invention, the rejection is improper and should be withdrawn.

4. Claims 3-12 and 20-21 have been rejected as being obvious over Tajalli et al and Munroe. However, a review of Munroe reveals that Munroe also fails to perform a comparison among trust groups or allowance of operation according to the results of the comparing step. At best, Munroe merely controls memory access based upon a domain level.

Since Munroe fails to teach or suggest a comparison among trust groups, the combination also fails to teach or suggest the comparison among trust groups. Since the combination fails to teach or suggest the comparison among trust groups, the combination fails to teach each and every claim limitation. Since the combination fails to teach each and every claim limitation, the rejection is believed to be improper and should be withdrawn.

5. The art made of record by the Examiner but not relied upon as a basis of rejection, does not, whether taken alone or in combination with Tajalli et al. and Munroe, anticipate or render obvious any of applicant's claims as now amended in the application.

For the foregoing reasons, applicant submits that the subject application is in condition for allowance and earnestly solicits an early Notice of Allowance. Should the Examiner be of the opinion that a telephone conference would expedite prosecution of the subject application, the Examiner is respectfully requested to call the undersigned at the below-listed number.

The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fee which may be required for this application under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16-1.18, including but not limited to the issue fee, or credit any overpayment, to Deposit Account No. 23-0920. Should no proper amount be enclosed herewith, as by a check being in the wrong amount, unsigned, post-dated, otherwise improper or informal, or even entirely missing, the Commissioner is authorized to charge the unpaid amount to Deposit

Account No. 23-0920. A duplicate copy of this sheet(s) is enclosed.

Respectfully submitted,

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PATENT APPLICATION

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METHOD FOR PROTECTING COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA FROM HOSTILE CODE

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to a method for protecting computer data and programs, and more generally to computer system and network security. The invention is useful for preventing data damage and theft, which can be done by malicious code attacks.

BACKGROUND

A computer in the present specification is a machine containing a processor and memory, and where the processor is able to execute instructions selected among a given set of instructions. A series of instructions for execution by the processor is called a "program" or "code." When stored in the memory of the computer, a program is referred to as "passive code." When loaded into the processor for execution, it is called a "process." Data is information that may be handled or managed in any way by a computer program; data may also be stored in the memory of the computer. A network comprises a plurality of computers connected together.

We call "malicious" or "hostile" any code designed or modified to intentionally corrupt or steal data or programs from the computer system or network on which it runs. Protecting from hostile code is a challenging problem, since there is no way to programmatically distinguish positive and negative program actions, other than knowing whether they are ultimately good for the user or not. For example, a program may delete a file because the user has explicitly asked it to, but a malicious program could also delete a file against the user's will. In other words, there is no proper technical definition of "malicious" or "hostile" code – these being defined according to the behavior expected from a computer by its legitimate user.

Although it is possible to authenticate authorized users with password, trusted users themselves may endanger the system and network's security by unknowingly running programs that contain malicious instructions such as "viruses," "Trojan horses," "malicious macros,"

“malicious scripts,” “worms,” “spying programs” and “backdoors.” A computer virus is a program that replicates by attaching itself to other programs. A Trojan horse is a program that in a general way does not do what the user expects it to do, but instead performs malicious actions such as data destruction and system corruption. Macros and scripts are programs written in high-level languages, which can be interpreted and executed by applications such as word processors, in order to automate frequent tasks. Because many macro and script languages require very little or no user interaction, malicious macros and scripts are often used to introduce viruses or Trojan horses into the system without user’s approval. A worm is a program that, like a virus, spreads itself. But unlike viruses, worms do not infect other host programs and instead send themselves to other users via networking means such as electronic mail. Spying programs are a subtype of Trojan horses, secretly installed on a victim computer in order to send out confidential data and passwords from that computer to the person who put them in. A backdoor is a secret functionality added to a program in order to allow its authors to crack or misuse it, or in a general way exploit the functionality for their own interest.

All of the above programs can compromise computer systems and a company’s confidentiality by corrupting data, propagating from one file to another, or sending confidential data to unauthorized persons, in spite of the user’s will.

Along the years, different techniques were created to protect computer systems against malicious programs:

Signature scanners detect viruses by using a pre-defined list of “known viruses.” They scan each file to-for each virus’ signatures listed in their known virus database. Each time a new virus is found anywhere in the world, it is added to that database. However, today more and more new viruses are created every day, and the known-viruses list needs to be constantly updated in order to be effective. Regularly updating an anti-virus is a heavy task for both the single-user and the network administrator and it leaves an important security gap between updates.

Another detection method, commonly called Heuristic Scanning consists of scanning programs for suspicious instructions that are typical to malicious programs and specifically viruses, without needing to have an exact signature of each virus in order to detect it in files. However, malicious program writers can avoid or hide those typical instructions by writing their code differently and/or encrypting it, and thus malicious code and viruses rapidly avoid detection by Heuristic Scanners.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,408,642 and U.S. Pat. No. 5,349,655, issued to Mann and U.S. Pat. No. 5,613,002, issued to Kephart et al., all disclose methods for recovering a computer program infected with a virus. The disclosed methods include generating fingerprint of data prior to infection by a virus and storing the fingerprint. Second fingerprint of data is then generated and compared to the prior strings of data, to determine if the data has been corrupted by a virus and for restoring the data to its initial state. These techniques do not prevent viruses from infecting, nor do they protect against other types of malicious programs.

U.S. Pat. No. 6,073,239, issued to the present inventor, discloses a method where file I/O activity is filtered. Whenever a program attempts to infect or inject code into another program file, it will be denied. The method, however, is only designed to work against executable-files viruses. It does not address other types of viruses, such as macro-viruses, nor other types of malicious programs: worms, Trojan horses, backdoors or spying software, because these malicious programs do not inject code nor modify other programs, but directly trigger malicious actions such as data corruption.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,421,006, issued to Jablon et al., discloses a method for assessing integrity of computer system software at the time of system initialization. Startup processes are verified before being allowed to execute. The method, however, does not prevent the protected processes from being corrupted in the first place, nor does it deal with data and programs other than those related to the system startup.

Other security methods consist of certifying programs that are authorized to run and blocking out all the other, unauthorized programs. Unfortunately, these techniques are not always adapted to open systems where users receive and exchange many files.

One common security system consists of establishing access control lists (i.e. ACL, DACL) that define restrictions and rights as to which users are allowed or not allowed to access certain resources, based on those users' rights. For example, system administrators are typically allowed to modify any files while simple users cannot read nor modify some confidential or critical files. Such security system is usually integrated in modern operating systems to ensure data security and confidentiality on a per-user basis. However, it is important to make a distinction and understand that this security scheme was designed to address the issue of user trust, not the issue of code trust. Users who run malicious programs within their systems will unknowingly compromise the integrity of every resource and file they're allowed to access with no further

protection. For instance, let's say user X is granted full access to the shared files A, B and C. If this user runs a program infected with a virus, the virus will be able to read, infect or even destroy the files A, B and C. This is due to the fact that access control lists are designed so that programs and tasks run in the security contexts of the users who started them. Thus, even though the user has not meant to actually harm files A, B and C, the program he ran did harm these files despite of the user's will, yet according ~~accordingly~~ to the user's rights. This is the heart of the malicious code problem. If a user runs hostile code, the code will be able to corrupt and steal any data within the system or network to which its user has access. And if a system administrator runs hostile code, the entire system and network are immediately compromised. ~~Also,~~ additionally Additional to these security problems, access control lists are statically defined for each file and resource. In environments where files are shared and exchanged every day, this does not provide enough security against malicious code, since users usually don't take the time to assign the right security attributes for each new file they create or receive. Such systems are disclosed in EP-A-0 472 487, or in the article of Moffett J. et al., entitled Specifying Discretionary Access Control Policy for Distributed Systems, Computer Communications vol. 13 no. 9 pp. 571-580.

"Sandboxing" techniques allow testing suspicious programs by safely running them in a secure "sandbox" environment without letting the tested program harm the system or its files. Malicious programs, however, may not perform the offensive or expected actions immediately during the test period, either because they detected that they're being tested, or because they're designed to perform their offensive actions randomly or at certain dates, for example. Hence, although a program seems to behave correctly during the test period, it can harm the system once it has passed the test and has been allowed to run for real. Also, positive programs may not behave correctly or may not function at all within a sandbox, as they may need to access files and resources within the system for normal reasons.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,398,196, to Chambers, discloses a method for emulating a program's execution in a virtual process, while searching for viral behavior. The disadvantages of this method are the same as above.

SUMMARY

The invention provides a solution for protecting data and program present on a computer from hostile code. It offers protection at any stage of operation of the computer, and protects the

computer from any type of hostile code. Specifically, the invention provides a process for protecting objects in a computer from hostile code, comprising the steps of :

- defining at least two trust groups;
- assigning objects and processes in the computer to one of said trust groups, irrespective of the rights of a user of said computer;
- upon operation of a process over an object or over a second process, comparing a trust group of the process with a trust group of the object or with the trust group of the second process, and
- allowing the operation according to the results of said comparing step.

In an embodiment, a process is assigned, upon it being created, to the trust group assigned to the passive code from which the process is created. One may also provide a step of changing the trust group of the process and / or of the object after said operation. One solution therefor is to assign the process to the trust group of the object or of the second process, when the operation is allowed.

The process may further comprise, upon creation of an object by a process, the step of assigning said created object to the trust group of said process.

In a preferred embodiment, trust groups are hierarchically ordered, and the step of allowing comprises:

- allowing said operation when the trust group of said process is higher in said hierarchy than the trust group of said object or of said second process or equal to the trust group of said object or of said second process, and
- denying said operation when the trust group of said process is lower in said hierarchy than the trust group of said object or of said second process.

One may also provide a step of assigning the process to the trust group of an object or of a second process after the operation is allowed.

There may also be defined at least two types of objects, objects being assigned to one of said types; the step of allowing operation over an object may then be carried out according to the type of said object. One may also define at least two types of operations; the step of allowing operation over a process being then carried out according to the type of said process. One may also define at least two types of operations; the step of allowing operation over an object is then carried out according to the type of said operation. It is further possible to define at least two

types of storage methods and assign a trust group to a type of storage method ~~methods~~; a storage operation for a process of a trust group may then be carried out according to the storage method assigned to the trust group of said process.

The invention further provides a computer, comprising

- objects and processes;
- a table of at least two trust groups, objects and processes in the computer being assigned to one of said trust groups irrespective of the rights of a user of said computer;
- a controller accessing said table and allowing an operation of a process over an object or over a second process according to the results of a comparison of the trust group of said process and the trust group of said object or of said second process.

The computer may further comprise a table of types of at least two types of objects, objects in the computer being assigned one type; in this instance, the controller accesses said table for allowing an operation. The table of trust groups is preferably stored in a non-volatile memory, as well as the table of types is stored in a non-volatile memory.

The computer may also comprise a table of rules; the controller then accesses the table of rules for allowing said operation. It is advantageous that the table of rules is stored in a non-volatile memory.

Last, the invention provides a computer network, comprising a server and at least one such computer; the table of trust groups is then stored in said server. It also provides a computer network, comprising a server and at least one such computer, the table of types is then stored in said server. It last comprises a computer network, comprising a server and at least one such computer; the table of rules is then stored in the server.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Other features and advantages of the invention will appear from the following description, where

- figure 1 shows diagrammatically passive code and a process;
- figure 2 is a flowchart of a process for assigning processes to a trust group;
- figure 3 is a flowchart of a process for assigning new objects to a trust group;
- figure 4 is a schematic view of a computer where the process is embodied;
- figure 5 is a flowchart of a process according to the invention;
- figure 6 is a flowchart of an operation of a process over an object; and

- figure 7 is a flowchart of the application of a rule.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The invention is based on the recognition that the action of hostile programs in spite of the user's will is due to the fact that programs run with the same access privileges as the users who executed them. Thus, any object that is accessible to the user, is also accessible to the programs he runs – and may therefore be accessed by a hostile program in case the user inadvertently or intentionally runs such a program.

The invention thus suggests defining trust groups, and assigning objects in a computer to one of the trust groups. Any operation of a process over an object is then allowed or denied according to the results of the comparison of the trusts groups of the process and of the object upon which the process operates.

The method of the invention is different from all prior art methods discussed above. There is no need to scan files or programs to detect known signatures; the process operates independently from the user. Instead of assigning rights to the user and allowing any action of the user, the invention assigns trust values to the programs and objects in the computer.

In a computer, we call "code" or "program" any set of instructions that can be interpreted or executed by the processor of the computer. When code is passively stored on a storage media without being executed, we call it "passive code." When code is actively running in memory, it is a "process." The mechanism of loading a program from the storage media where it resides as passive code, into memory (e.g. RAM) where it runs as an active process, is called "execution." Figure 1 illustrates an example of code execution mechanism: here, a file 2 called "WORD.EXE" represents passive code. This file is stored in a storage device of the computer, such as a hard disk. When the computer instructs to execute it, the Operating System (OS) copies an image of this file into memory (RAM) and runs it from there. At this stage, "WORD" is a process 4, since it is now running. Note that although the file "WORD.EXE" and the process "WORD" that is in memory may have similar contents (because one is initially copied from the other), they are two different entities: each can be modified without affecting the other. Additionally, the computer user can execute "WORD.EXE" several times and have several different "WORD" processes running at the same time, but separately. Furthermore, processes can execute passive codes and hence create other processes. If a process A creates a process B, process A is called the "parent process" and process B is called a "child process."

We call an "object" any file, passive code, document, script, macro, process, registry key or other system object that needs to be protected by the present invention, or that contains Code that can be interpreted by the OS (operating system) or any Process. An object containing Code is preferably protected, since it may be executed, and may therefore be used for hostile purposes.

Processes and objects being defined, the process suggest defining trust groups, and assigning objects and processes to one of the trust groups. A trust group is thus a set of processes and objects. The way objects and processes are assigned to the trust groups is discussed below; and it should only be noted that the trust groups are independent of the rights of the user of the computer. In other words, trust groups are different from the rights defined in the prior art.

For the sake of convenience, trust groups may simply be represented by a trust value common to all elements of the group. This value may be represented as a number, or by any other representation. In the simplest instance, two groups are defined. The groups could then be represented by 0 and 1 – where one of these values means "trusted" and the other one means "untrusted". As exemplified below, trust values could also be a number from 0 to 10. This may allow up to 11 trust groups to be defined. For determining objects and processes to one of the trust groups, one may use a trust table, representative of the trust group of each process or object assigned to one of the trust groups. There may be provided two tables, for storing separately trust groups for objects and processes. Indeed, it is advantageous that the trust table for the objects be recorded on a non-volatile storage device, e.g. a hard disk or a remote server; on the other hand, since processes are essentially active in RAM only, a trust table for processes may be stored in the RAM.

Objects and processes being thus assigned to trust groups, any operation of a process over an object – e.g. for modifying or deleting an existing object causes the trust group of the process to be compared to the trust group of the object. The operation may then be allowed or not allowed according to the results of the comparing step.

The process disclosed above protects objects in the computer from hostile code. Assume for instance two groups are defined, one containing "trusted" objects and processes, the other one containing "untrusted" objects and processes. As explained below, trusted objects and processes could be considered not hostile, e.g. commercial code and the like. One would allow or not allow an operation of a process upon an object depending on the trust group. For instance, in the simplest embodiment, the only prohibited operations would be the operations of an "untrusted"

process over a "trusted" object. This embodiment is crude, and it still makes it possible to restrict the operation of the computer so that there is no risk of hostile code interacting with the computer. Indeed, such code would be assigned to the "untrusted" group – since its origin may not be identified. As compared to the prior art system of rights, this process also protects the computer from actions of the user. Since processes and objects are assigned to the trust groups irrespective of the user, the user may not endanger the computer, even if he has high level rights.

As briefly explained above, one may start by assigning objects to various trust groups. Objects may be assigned to the trust groups according to the confidence given to these objects. For instance, software purchased from a computer vendor would normally be more trusted than software downloaded from unknown Internet Web or FTP sites. Software copied at the installation of a computer may also be considered as trustworthy ~~trustful~~, and may be assigned to a trust group accordingly. Objects installed later would be assigned to a trust group representative of a lower trust. Assigning objects to trust group may be carried out by a computer supervisor. This supervisor is the person who is in charge of the computer's security. In a networked environment, this is usually the network administrator. In single-user environments, this can be the machine user.

The same method may be used for assigning processes to trust group. It is, however, clear that this is likely to be time-consuming and not very effective. Figure 2 therefore shows a flowchart for assigning processes to a trust group. As discussed above, processes are created from passive code. One solution for assigning a process to a trust group is therefore to assign this process to the trust group assigned to the passive code starting from which the process is created. This is shown in figure 2 in the embodiment where trust groups are defined in an object trust table and in a process trust table. In step 8, passive code is executed, thus creating a process in RAM. In step 10, the object trust table is consulted for determining the trust group to which the passive code is assigned. In step 12, the process is assigned to the same trust group. This is marked in the process trust table. The process of figure 2 makes it possible to assign simply and rapidly processes to a given trust group.

Figure 3 shows a flowchart for assigning new objects to a trust group. Briefly, a new object is assigned to the same trust group as the process that created it. In step 20, an existing process, assigned to a given trust group, creates a new object. In the next step 22, the process trust table is consulted for determining the trust group to which the process is assigned. In step 24, the new

object is assigned to the same trust group. This is marked in the object trust table. The method of figure 3 makes it possible to assign simply and rapidly new objects to a given trust group. It may not be carried out in every instance. Thus, this method could be carried out under normal use of the computer. Another method would be carried out when new objects are installed on the computer. One may also allow the supervisor only to use a method different from the one of figure 3 for assigning objects to trust groups. Again, this is different from the prior methods, since the objects are assigned to a trust group, regardless of whoever the user of the computer is. In other words, once an object is assigned to a trust group, this assignment of the object applies for any future user, be it the supervisor or another user.

In one specific embodiment of the invention, one may refine the rules for allowing operations. As discussed above, operation of a process over an object may be allowed on the sole basis of the comparison of the trust groups. One may also define different types of objects, operations or processes. An operation would then be allowed or carried out taking into account ~~eeount~~ the type of object, operation, process or storage method. For objects, one could for instance distinguish between passive code and other objects, and allow different operations according to the type of objects. This allows providing further protection to certain types of objects. For processes, one could distinguish between processes according to user-defined process types. For operations, one could distinguish between opening, reading, creating, modifying or deleting. Again, this makes it possible to makes some operations – e.g. those deemed to be more risky – more difficult to carry out than others. One could also define different storage methods – e.g. using encryption and/or compression – and assign a trust group to a given storage method. In this case, a process in a trust group would use the storage method to which its trust group is assigned. This makes it possible to use various storage methods according to the level of confidence granted to the processes. One could thus protect trusted information – information created by a trusted process – by encrypting it.

So far, the description protects a computer against hostile code. It may however interfere too much with the operation of the computer – it being understood that any protection against hostile code will interfere with the operation of the computer, and will limit the scope of allowed operation. A more flexible example is now described. In this example, trust groups may be changed, for processes and/or for objects, in case an operation is allowed. This makes it possible to broaden the scope of operations, while still protecting the computer. Alternatively, it may

improve the protection of the computer. An example is given in the case of two trust groups. The rules for allowing operations could then comprise the following rules:

- allow operation of a process assigned to the "trusted" group over an object of this group;
- allow operation of a process assigned to the "trusted" group over an object of the "untrusted" group, and assign the process to the "untrusted" group thereafter, with other rules being defined for the other cases. Assume for instance the process is the WORD process discussed above. Assume also that this process is in the "trusted" group. The WORD process may access a trusted object, e.g. a trusted file. When the WORD process accesses some untrusted object, e.g. a new file downloaded from an Internet server, the operation is allowed. However, the process then passes from the trusted group to the untrusted group. This ensures that the process, which may have been corrupted by the untrusted object, will not contaminate objects in the trusted group. The number of possible operations is increased, while still protecting the computer; the protection is also improved.

All features discussed above were discussed separately, for the sake of clarity, one should understand that these features, or some of them only may be combined.

Figure 4 is a schematic view of a computer where the invention is carried out. The computer 30 comprises non-volatile memory 32, e. g. a hard drive, a floppy disk, or the like. It has a processor 34 with associated RAM 35. The processor 34 is connected and accesses both non-volatile memory 32 and RAM 35. Memory 32 contains a number of objects 36, as well as a table 38 of objects trust groups. There is also provided in memory 32 a table 40 of types for the objects, as well as a table 42 of rules. RAM 34 contains a number of active processes 44, a table 46 of processes trust groups, as well as a table 47 of types of processes. In addition, there is provided in RAM 32 a controller 48 for accessing the tables of trust groups when a process is operating over an object. The controller allows the operation according to the results of a comparison of the trust group of the process and of the trust group of the object. This controller may be designed to work at the OS-level, and may be implemented in a Driver, VxD or TSR, depending on the OS type.

We now provide an example of another embodiment of the invention, where trust groups are hierarchically ordered. Such an order makes it simpler to devise rules for allowing or denying operations, upon comparison of trust groups. Trust groups may then simply be referred to as a trust value associated with the group. The words "trust groups" and "trust value" are used

interchangeably in the rest of this specification. The order of the trust groups may for instance be selected as follows: the higher an object's trust value is, the less accessible and more protected it will be, and vice versa. In the example, the trust value is a number from 0 to 10. The objects of a new machine have a high trust value. A computer's trust regresses with time, as new software and files are executed and opened on it. Thus, the computer supervisor will typically set all objects to a high trust value upon installation of a new machine. Any object installed or introduced later into the computer, will have by default a low trust value, unless the supervisor explicitly specifies otherwise (e.g. when installing a new commercial software).

Object Trust Table

Thus, each system's object is initially provided with a supervisor-defined trust value. All of the objects' trust values are recorded in a "Object Trust Table," stored on a storage media such as a hard disk or a database server. Any object that is added to the system will obviously not be listed in the Object Trust Table as it was set initially, and thus all objects that are not stored in the Object Trust Table are automatically considered with a low trust value by default. For example, when the machine is in its original clean state, the supervisor can mark trusted objects with a high trust value. Any objects received from the outside after that moment will automatically be assigned with a low trust value, unless the supervisor specifies otherwise.

Process Trust Table

Processes, just like objects, are assigned with trust values. As discussed above, Process trust also regresses with time. Indeed, trusted processes that load or interpret code can be manipulated into performing malicious actions themselves. For example, a Process that is initially in a trusted state can become hostile in its turn if it opens a file with macros that instruct it to spy or destroy data. Processes trust values will be stored in a second table called "Process Trust Table." This table is stored in a storage media such as RAM (Random Access Memory), and can be emptied every time the OS loads-up or restarts, since at that point there are no Processes running. When a Process is created during the phase of execution, it obtains the same trust value as the Passive Code from which it was loaded. For example, if the Passive Code "WORD.EXE" was marked with a trust value of 10, then whenever WORD.EXE is executed, the resulting new Process "WORD" will be initialized with a trust value of 10, too. Figure 2 shows how a Process obtains a trust value that depends on the object from which it was loaded.

Creation/Modification of an object

As explained above in reference to figure 3, when a Process creates a new object, this object obtains the same trust attributes as that Process. When a process modifies the contents of an existing object – upon which it is allowed to operate – the object's trust group is amended to the trust group of the process. This makes it possible to take into consideration possible contamination of an object by a process.

Interaction between Processes and objects

Figure 5 shows a flowchart of the process in the present example. Processes can access objects having the same trust value as themselves. In other words, a Process whose trust value is 5 can access an object whose trust value is 5. However, Processes cannot access objects having trust values higher than themselves. For example, a Process whose trust value is 5 cannot access an object whose trust value is 10.

When a Trusted Process accesses an object with a lower trust value, the trust value of this Process itself is immediately changed in the Process Trust Table and becomes as low as the accessed object's, and this remains until the Process is terminated. That way, the next time this Process attempts to access an object, it will be less privileged than before it accessed the untrusted object. For example, a Process with a trust value of 10 is allowed to access objects whose trust value is 10. But if it opens an object whose trust value is 9, the Process' trust value will be lowered to 9 and from that point on it will not be allowed to access objects with trust values higher than 9, and this until the process is terminated or restarted. This takes into consideration the fact that a process accessing an object may be contaminated by the object. Lowering the trust value of the process avoids trusted objects from being contaminated.

Figure 5 illustrates the way interaction is done between Processes and objects. In step 50, a Process (P) attempts to access an object (R). In step 52, we look-up through the Process Trust Table, looking for the entry matching Process P. We store the result in PT. In step 54, we look-up through the Object Trust Table, looking for the entry matching object R. We store the result in RT. In step 56, PT is compared with RT. If both trust values are equal, access is allowed in step 58. Back to step 56, if PT and RT were not equal, we test in step 60 if the Process' trust value is higher than the object's. If this is the case, in step 62, the entry for the Process in the Process Trust Table is set to RT and we proceed to step 64 where access to the object is allowed. Note that the next time Process P attempts to access an object, it will go through the same decision-

making except that its trust value will be different, as it was changed in step 62. Going back to step 60, if the Process' trust value is lower than the object's, then we proceed to step 66 where access to the object is denied.

Specific example of the invention

The following tables provide specific examples of the process in different scenarios.

Table 1

Order	Actions Performed by the System	Operations performed by the controller	Process trust value
1	Execution of WORD.EXE whose trust value is 10.	Mark the newly-created Process with the same trust value as WORD.EXE: 10	10
2	WORD Process opens object INFO.DOC whose trust value is 10.	Allow	10
3	WORD Process creates a new object: NEWFILE.DOC	Mark the newly-created object with the same trust value as the Process': 10.	10
4	WORD Process opens object MACRO.DOC, whose trust value is 5.	Change WORD Process' trust value in the Process Trust Table to 5 and Allow access to the object.	5
5	WORD Process attempts to open object INFO.DOC, whose trust value is 10.	Deny access to the object.	5
6	WORD Process creates a new object: NEWFILE2.DOC.	Mark the newly-created object with the same trust value as the Process': 5.	5

The example of Table 1 shows rules for allowing the operation of the process over the object, as discussed in reference to figure 5.

Table 2

Order	Actions Performed by the System	Operations performed by the Invention	Process trust value
1	Execution of an object whose trust value is 1: VIRUS.EXE	Mark the newly-created Process with the same trust value as VIRUS.EXE: 1	1
2	VIRUS Process attempts to access object C:\WINDOWS.EXE, whose trust value is 10.	Deny access to the object.	1
3	VIRUS Process creates a new object: PAYLOAD.EXE	Mark the newly-created object with the same trust value as the Process': 1.	1

The example of Table 2 evidences that a low trust process or object may not contaminate or harm a process having a higher trust value. In the example of a virus, the virus cannot propagate through the Windows object.

Thus, with the method presented so far we have secured the computer, while still allowing a number of operations. We now describe another embodiment variant of this method, which is more flexible and faster.

trust groups

In addition to providing each object with a trust value, e.g. by defining trust groups, additional information and behavior is defined for objects and processes in the groups. Each object and process is linked to a "Trust Group," using a Trust Group identifier. The following table is an example of Process Trust Table where each process, identified by an OS-provided process ID (PID), is linked to a Trust Group with a Trust Group identifier.

Table 3

SYSTEM-DEFINED PID	100	110	120	130	140
TRUST GROUP ID	1	1	2	1	3

Trust Group definitions may be recorded in a central table called "Trust Groups Table," recorded on a central storage media (e.g. file server, hard-drive or non-volatile memory). Each Trust Group may have a data structure shown in the following table.

Table 4

Trust Group (TG)
ID: Trust Group Id
TV: trust value
FromLower: Rules list
ToLower: Rules list

ID is an index value, recorded in the Object Trust Table and the Process Trust Table, which identifies the Trust Group to which objects and Processes belong. TV is the group's trust value. FromLower is a list of rules to be applied when requests are made by processes whose Trust Group's trust value is lower than TV, targeted at objects belonging to TG. ToLower is a list of rules to be applied when a process belonging to group TG is making requests on objects whose trust values are lower than TV. The following tables are an example of Trust Group definitions, with three different trust groups.

Table 5

Trust Group 1
ID: 1
TV: 8
FromLower rules: A

Table 6

Trust Group 2
ID: 2
TV: 5
FromLower rules: C

Table 7

Trust Group 3
ID: 3
TV: 10
FromLower rules: E

ToLower rules: B

ToLower rules: D

ToLower rules: F

A "rules list" links several rule nodes together. Each rule node is formed as shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Rule (R)
OP: Operations
OT: Target object types
A: Action to perform

OP indicates what kind of I/O operations this rule applies for. For example, OP can be: Open, Read, or Write. OT is the type of objects for which this rule applies. It can be, for example: executable files, document files and registry keys. Objects can also be applied to functions that need to be limited to Processes with certain trust groups. For example, indicating "networking API" as an object type forbids use of networking operations to untrusted Processes. A is the action to perform when OP and OT match a request. It can be for example: "Deny," "Allow," "Set requesting process' trust to target object's" and/or "Set target object's trust to process." These last two actions allow for dynamically changing a process or an object's trust groups, according to its interaction with other processes and objects. Table 9 shows an example of several rules lists.

Table 9

	Rules A	Rules B	Rules C	Rules D	Rules E	Rules F
	<u>Rule #1</u>	<u>Rule #1</u>	<u>Rule #1</u>	<u>Rule #1</u>	<u>Rule #1</u>	<u>Rule #1</u>
OP:	Read, Write	Read	Open	Open	Write	Open
OT:	Registry keys	Document s	Registry keys	Image files	Any file	Text files
A:	Deny	Deny	Deny	Allow	Deny	Allow

	<u>Rule #2</u>	<u>Rule #2</u>	<u>Rule #2</u>	<u>Rule #2</u>	<u>Rule #2</u>	<u>Rule #2</u>
OP:	Open	Open	Read	Open	Read	Open
OT:	Images	Executabl es	Executable s	Any file	Documents	Any file
A:	Deny	Deny	Allow	Deny	Deny	Deny

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Let us now see how this new implementation works. Figure 6 illustrates a flowchart in which a process (P) attempts to access an object (O), as shown in step 70. In step 72, we look-up through the Process Trust Table, looking for the entry matching Process P. On most operating systems, the process can be identified by its process ID (PID). The Trust Group ID associated with the process is stored in PTID. In step 74, we look-up through the Trust Groups Table, looking for the trust group whose ID matches PTID. In steps 76 and 78, we repeat the same operations for the object that the process is attempting to access. In step 76 we look for the object's Trust Group ID within the Object Trust Table and store it in OTID. In step 78 we look-up the Trust Groups Table for the Trust Group whose ID matches OTID. In step 80, we compare the trust value fields of the process' Trust Group to that of the object's Trust Group. If the process' trust group has a higher trust value, we proceed to step 82, where we apply the rules from the process' trust group ToLower field. Back to step 80, if the process' trust group did not

have a higher trust value than the object's, we proceed to step 84, where we test if the process' trust group has a lower trust value. If that is the case, we proceed to step 86, where we apply the rules from the target object's FromLower field. Back to step 84, if the process' trust group and the object's trust group had equal trust value fields, then access is allowed to the object in step 88.

Figure 7 shows how a rule is applied from a trust group's rules list field. In step 90, we refer to the rules list that needs to be applied. In IOOP, we have the operation that is requested on the target object (O). Steps 92 to 98 are executed in a loop, for each rule node in the rules list. In step 96, we test if the current rule's OP field contains the requested operation IOOP. Such test can be done using a bit combination for example, where each possible operation is represented by a bit, and the whole number represents the total set of operations. If the test is not positive, we proceed to the next rule in step 92. Similarly, in step 98 we test if the current rule's OT field contains the type of object O. The object's type can be for example: executable file, document file, registry key etc. If this is not the case, we proceed to the next rule in step 92. If both conditions were true, the process is finished in step 100, where the action to be applied is obtained from the rule node's Action field. If no rule was found that matches the required conditions, the process is finished in step 102, where the operation is by default allowed.

To enhance flexibility further, rule nodes can also have a "rules priority" field. This allows resolving tests between two different trust groups having the same trust values: the group whose rules priority is higher, will be obeyed to. This can also help with special cases where the rules of the trust group with the lowest trust value needs to be applied instead of that of the trust group with the highest trust value, as was shown in Figure 7.

Hence, it is now possible to establish a secure environment in which several Trust Groups protect different objects with different security attributes. The invention is designed to work at the OS-level, filtering I/O operations. This is usually implemented in a Driver, VxD or TSR, depending on the OS type.

The examples given above may be changed. Trust Groups can be pre-defined and/or configurable. The process may apply to I/O operations as well as API function calls or any program-triggered action that may endanger the system.

CLAIMS

WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1. A process for protecting a computer from hostile code, comprising the steps of:
defining at least two trust groups;
assigning objects and processes in the computer to one of said trust groups, irrespective of the rights of a user of said computer;
upon operation of a process over an object or over a second process, comparing a trust group of the process with a trust group of the object or with the trust group of the second process, and
allowing the operation according to the results of said comparing step.
2. The process of claim 1 wherein a process is assigned upon creation to the trust group assigned to the passive code starting from which the process is created.
3. The process of claim 1 further comprising the step of changing the trust group of said process after said operation.
4. The process of claim 1 further comprising the step of changing the trust group of said object or of said second process after said operation.
5. The process of claim 1 further comprising, upon creation of an object by a process, the step of assigning said created object to the trust group of said process.
6. The process of claim 1 further comprising, when said operation is allowed, the step of assigning said process to the trust group of said object or of said second process.
7. The process of claim 1 wherein said trust groups are hierarchically ordered, and wherein the step of allowing further comprises:
allowing said operation when the trust group of said process is higher or equal in said hierarchy than the trust group of said object or of said second process; and
denying said operation when the trust group of said process is lower in said hierarchy than the trust group of said object or of said second process.
8. The process of claim 7 further comprising the step of assigning said process to the trust group of said object or of said second process after the operation is allowed.
9. The process of claim 1 further comprising:
defining at least two types of objects;
assigning objects to one of said types; and

wherein the step of allowing operation over an object is further carried out according to the type of said object.

10. The process of claim 1 further comprising:
defining at least two types of processes;
assigning processes to one of said types, and
and wherein the step of allowing operation of a process is further carried out according to the type of said process.
11. The process of claim 1, further comprising:
defining at least two types of operations; and
wherein the step of allowing operation of a process over an object or over a second process is further carried out according to the type of said operation.
12. The process of claim 1, further comprising:
defining at least two types of storage methods,
assigning a trust group to a type of storage methods; and
carrying out a storage operation for a process of a trust group according to the storage method assigned to the trust group of said process.
13. A computer comprising:
objects and processes;
a table of at least two trust groups, and objects and processes in the computer being assigned to one of said trust groups irrespective of the rights of a user of said computer; and
a controller configured to access said table and allow an operation of a process over an object or over a second process according to the results of a comparison of the trust group of said process and the trust group of said object or the trust group of said second process.
14. The computer of claim 13 further comprising:
a table of types of at least two types of objects, the objects in the computer being assigned one type;
and wherein the controller accesses said table for allowing said operation.
15. The computer of claim 13, wherein said table of trust groups is stored in a non-volatile memory.
16. The computer of claim 13, wherein said table of types is stored in a non-volatile memory.

17. The computer of claim 13, further comprising a table of rules, and wherein said controller accesses said table of rules.

18. The computer of claim 13, wherein said table of rules is stored in a non-volatile memory.

19. The computer of claim 13, wherein the computer is operatively coupled to a network, the network including a server, the table of trust groups stored in said server.

20. A computer according to claim 19, wherein said table of types is stored in said server.

21. A computer according to claim 19, wherein said table of rules is stored in said server.

ABSTRACT

A method that protects computer data from untrusted programs. Each computer's object and process is assigned with trust attributes, which define the way it can interact with other objects within the system. The trust attributes are defined hierarchically so that processes cannot access objects with higher trust levels than themselves. When accessing objects with lower trust levels, processes can see their trust levels lowered to that of the object accessed. The interaction between processes and objects of different levels is entirely programmable.